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European Commission’s proposals on trade secrets
Risk undermining public health and must be modified
Martin McKee professor of European public health 1, Ronald Labonté Canada research chair in
globalization and health equity 2
1London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1H 9SH, UK; 2University of Ottawa, Canada
In late 2013 the European Commission published proposals to
harmonise elements of existing national legislation on trade
secrets.1 These will shortly be debated in the European
parliament but, in their present form, they have created serious
concerns among non-governmental organisations concerned
with health policy.2
Strengthening protection against disclosure of trade secrets is
the most recent step in a process whereby multinational
corporations have increasingly sought to commodify knowledge.
Thus, the drug industry has lobbied to strengthen the protection
given to it by the patent system—for example, by persuading
governments to increase the duration of protection for so called
orphan drugs3 and using international trade negotiations to
enable it to claim rights in previously unprotected markets such
as India. A diverse range of industries has exploited the
opportunities provided by transfer pricing, whereby operations
selling a trademarked commodity in one country pay large sums
to another part of the same corporation based in a low tax
jurisdiction for the right to use the brand name and associated
imagery.4
The arguments in favour of such arrangements are well
rehearsed. Patent law gives corporations rights over intellectual
property and enables them to innovate without the risk that
others might profit from their ideas. This reflects a social
contract whereby those innovating will obtain a time limited
degree of protection, based on the idea of a fair return on their
investment, in return for the contribution that their products,
such as newmedicines, make to society or to economic growth.
The same principles underpin the use of copyright. Trademarks
are also considered to offer a societal benefit, placing owners
under an implied responsibility to ensure the quality of their
product. However, many trade secrets are not protected by
patent, copyright, or trademark legislation and, within Europe,
their protection varies greatly from country to country. At
present, there is not even a common definition of trade secrets.
The proposed directive would remedy this, adopting the
definition used in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which draws on the US
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.5 A trade secret is defined as
something that is “not generally known among or readily
accessible to persons . . . that normally deal with the kind of
information in question.” It must also have some commercial
value, and reasonable steps must have been taken to preserve
secrecy. Interestingly, the directive treats trade secrets differently
from other forms of intellectual property in that there is no
owner as such. Instead it uses the term “holder,” which confers
no exclusive right to possess the information concerned.
Although the benefits of the proposals to large corporations are
apparent, there are also important criticisms. Some have
questioned whether there is even any need for them. Member
state governments argue that the existing lack of legal
harmonisation is a barrier to innovation, reducing
competitiveness as companies fearing their secrets will be
misappropriated apply costly measures to protect them.6 Yet
the survey of businesses used in the case for legislation provides
little support for these arguments,7 and the commission’s impact
assessment finds that most companies already share trade secrets
using their own disclosure agreements.8 Nor is it clear that the
proposals will provide legal certainty because many elements
remain vague.7 9 They may not even be directed at the right
targets, given the growing evidence of industrial espionage by
certain governments.10
Health implications
It is, however, in health policy where many unanswered
questions are now emerging. Do the harms to patients associated
with non-disclosure of trial results and adverse drug reactions
by the pharmaceutical industry argue for less rather than more
trade secrecy?11 The European Food Safety Agency depends on
manufacturers’ assessments of safety, but those manufacturers
regard the results as trade secrets, so could these become even
more difficult to access? Could whistleblowers and undercover
reporters highlighting threats to public health—for example, by
exposing grossly unhygienic practices and adulteration of
foodstuffs—lose what few safeguards they have? Could
researchers studying tactics used by the tobacco, alcohol, and
junk food industry to market their products to children find
themselves in breach of the law? Will proposed limits to
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disclosure of trade secrets in civil litigation constrain the ability
of protestors to cite evidence that might justify their actions?
It may be argued that the proposals contain sufficient protection
for the public interest. There is a provision for whistleblowers
to “reveal misconduct or wrongdoing.” Yet this would be
permitted only when such action was strictly “necessary” to
reveal wrongdoing. This test may not be met if it was already
known that the corporation had done wrong but the secrets were
acquired to illustrate the scale and scope of its actions.7 Nor
might it protect an investigative reporter who went undercover
following reasonable suspicion that wrongdoing was occurring
but who discovered that it was not, or when additional material,
not strictly relevant to the allegedmisconduct, was inadvertently
obtained.
In recent years the European Commission has given a much
greater priority to economic growth and competitiveness than
to social policy. This is exemplified by the recent proposal,
abandoned in the face of widespread protests, to move
pharmaceutical policy from the health directorate general to the
internal market, industry, and entrepreneurship directorate.12
The European parliament will return to the proposals on trade
secrets in April. Maybe it will be able to redress the balance in
favour of the citizens of Europe whose interests it is meant to
represent.
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